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LEGAL PROFESSIONAL DE(RE)REGULATION, 
EQUALITY, AND INCLUSION, AND THE 
CONTESTED SPACE OF PROFESSIONALISM 
WITHIN THE LEGAL MARKET 
IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
Lisa Webley* 
INTRODUCTION 
The legal profession in England and Wales is undergoing an 
unprecedented process of de(re)regulation1 as a result of the Legal Services 
Act 20072 (LSA 2007 or LSA).  New types of legal businesses are 
emerging, and law graduates—who previously had not found a place within 
the regulated admitted legal profession—appear to be entering new facets of 
the legal marketplace, albeit often in precarious circumstances via 
circuitous routes.3  Moreover, globalization and the increased mobility of 
legal professionals around Europe and industrialized and industrializing 
common law countries are also reshaping sections of the legal market.4  
 
*  Professor of Empirical Legal Studies, University of Westminster.  I am grateful for the 
contributions of all who organized, hosted, and contributed to The Challenge of Equity and 
Inclusion in the Legal Profession: An International and Comparative Perspective 
Colloquium held at Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview of the colloquium, 
see Deborah L. Rhode, Foreword:  Diversity in the Legal Profession:  A Comparative 
Perspective, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241 (2015). 
 
 1. I have used de(re)regulation to connote the confluence of a move to deregulate the 
legal profession, namely to remove much of its apparatus and power of self-regulation, and 
to reregulate the legal profession along market principles in accordance with New Labour’s 
Third Way regulatory policy, discussed later in the Article. 
 2. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29 (Eng.). 
 3. On legal business innovation, see Lisa Webley, When Is a Family Lawyer a 
Lawyer?, in DELIVERING FAMILY JUSTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Mavis Maclean et al. eds., 
forthcoming May 2015).  On entry into the legal sector, see generally HILARY SOMMERLAD, 
LISA WEBLEY, LIZ DUFF, DANIEL MUZIO & JENNIFER TOMLINSON, DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES:  A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF BARRIERS AND INDIVIDUAL 
CHOICES (2013), and Hilary Sommerlad, The New “Professionalism” in England and Wales:  
Talent, Diversity, and a Legal Precariat, in DIVERSITY IN PRACTICE:  RHETORIC AND REALITY 
(Robert Nelson et al. eds., forthcoming 2015). 
 4. See John Flood, The Re-Landscaping of the Legal Profession:  Large Law Firms and 
Professional Re-Regulation, 59 CURRENT SOC’Y 507, 521 (2011).  For example, the E.U. 
freedom of movement treaty provisions and subsequent mutual recognition of legal 
professional qualifications has played a role in this.  It has led to the growth in the number of 
Registered Foreign Lawyers practicing in England and Wales (for figures see Regulated 
Population Statistics, SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTH., http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-we-
work/reports/data/population_solicitors.page), some of whom will requalify as solicitors in 
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Although the new market model may be encouraging legal employers to 
hire a broader cohort of law graduates, including those historically denied 
access to a full career in law, it is also encouraging greater role and status 
differentiation as between lawyers.5  The new model obfuscates the barriers 
that face nonwhite and working class law graduates who wish to become 
fully admitted members of the profession.6  Further, while equality and 
inclusion discourse is well rehearsed regarding professional admission and 
promotion,7 that terminology is less prominent in the access to justice 
debate.  Thus, it is unclear if market innovations are prompting greater 
equality and inclusion for marginalized would-be clients or allowing the 
state and the legal profession(s) to evade the fundamental rule of law 
precept of access to justice for all. 
This Article aims to examine equality and inclusion in legal services 
from the perspectives of would-be lawyers and would-be clients.  It begins 
by examining the state and solicitors’ changing relationship regarding 
access to justice, professional independence, and the rule of law.  It then 
considers the changes that the LSA 2007 wrought, and whether this 
neoliberal turn can deliver equality and inclusion within the profession and 
by the profession for those seeking redress with legal help.  It also explores 
whether de(re)regulation may be altering the legal profession(s)’s ability to 
act as gatekeeper to the profession(s) and whether this too may have an 
impact on equality and inclusion within the legal services sector and the 
protection of consumers’ legal rights.8 
I.   THE SOLICITORS’ PROFESSION AND THE STATE:  
EQUALITY AND INCLUSION THROUGH PARTNERSHIP? 
Civil legal aid is a useful case study through which to chart solicitors’ 
profession compact with the state.9  It also provides a vehicle through 
 
England and Wales through the Qualified Lawyers Transfer Scheme (for details of the 
scheme, see Qualified Lawyers Transfer Scheme, SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTH., 
http://www.sra.org.uk/qlts/). 
 5. See Webley, supra note 3. 
 6. See SOMMERLAD ET AL., supra note 3, at 25–30; Lisa Webley et al., Access to a 
Career in the Legal Profession in England and Wales:  Race, Class and the Role of 
Educational Background, in DIVERSITY IN PRACTICE, supra note 3. 
 7. For gender-related equality and diversity literature, see generally Lisa Webley & Liz 
Duff, Women Solicitors As a Barometer for Problems Within the Legal Profession—Time to 
Put Values Before Profits?, 34 J.L. & SOC’Y 374 (2007).  For literature on minorities and the 
profession, see generally Hilary Sommerlad, Minorities, Merit, and Misrecognition in the 
Globalized Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2481 (2012). 
 8. A note on the difficulty of terminology regarding the legal profession(s) in England 
and Wales:  because the profession is split (the main branches being solicitors, barristers, and 
chartered legal executives), it is difficult to talk of the legal profession as a monolith.  
Further, each branch is increasingly heterogeneous, and thus at times I refer to individual 
branches of the profession(s) and sectors within them, although the switches in approach are 
not ideal. 
 9. For a detailed and forensic insight into legal aid development in England, Wales, and 
Scotland, see generally ALAN PATERSON, HAMLYN LECTURES 2010:  LAWYERS AND THE 
PUBLIC GOOD 59–124 (2012). 
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which to view the waning influence of political and economic liberalism,10 
as successive governments introduced neoliberal reforms to embed market 
economics and consumer choice within the discourse of access to justice 
and legal service provision.11 
A.   The Scheme at Its Inception:  Liberal Collectivism:  The Middle Way 
The civil legal aid system in England and Wales emerged from the 
postwar Butskellite consensus as a form of Middle Way collective welfare 
provision offered via a state-market partnership to serve the practical needs 
of a liberal market.12  It was introduced by the Attlee Labour government in 
the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949.13  A liberal collectivist state-market 
partnership was an ideal mechanism to adopt given that it developed from 
the previous pro bono charitable model already operated by the Law 
Society.14  The structures of the charitable relief model were simply 
amended to permit an expanded, yet state-subsidized, solution to legal 
need.15  The system was administered by the then-solicitors’ professional 
body on behalf of the state (the Law Society of England and Wales), and 
the day-to-day services were provided by private practice lawyers operating 
within a state-defined scheme.  Payment for the work was made from 
general taxation.  This scheme provided a mechanism by which people of 
moderate and limited means could enforce and defend their legal rights and 
responsibilities.  Given the relatively limited litigation culture at that time, 
the civil legal aid system facilitated a redistribution of legal costs across 
 
 10. Liberalism is a contested term and there is insufficient space in this Article to 
examine competing conceptions here.  For the purposes of this discussion, liberalism is 
considered to be an ideology that seeks to maximize citizens’ freedom through the exercise 
of individual rights, within a moderate state adhering to a democratic tradition. It regulates 
business and the market so as to limit concentrations of power; it provides a welfare state so 
as to reduce inequality through some measure of redistribution of power and/or capital.  For 
a fuller discussion, see Simon Clarke, The Neoliberal Theory of Society, in NEOLIBERALISM:  
A CRITICAL READER (Alfredo Saad-Filho & Deborah Johnston eds., 2005). 
 11. For a discussion of the politics of lawyering, see generally LAWYERS AND THE RISE 
OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM:  EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA FROM THE EIGHTEENTH 
TO TWENTIETH CENTURIES (Terrence Halliday & Lucien Karpik eds., 1997); Terrence 
Halliday, The Politics of Lawyers:  An Emerging Agenda, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1007 
(1999); Stuart A. Scheingold, Taking Weber Seriously:  Lawyers, Politics and the Liberal 
State, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1061 (1999). 
 12. PETE ALCOCK, SOCIAL POLICY IN BRITAIN 186–88 (3d ed. 2008). 
 13. Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51 (Eng.). 
 14. See Richard I. Morgan, The Introduction of Civil Legal Aid in England and Wales, 
1914–1949, 5 TWENTIETH CENTURY BRIT. HIST. 38, 41–44 (1994); Maureen Spencer, Public 
Subsidies Without Strings—Labour and the Lawyers at the Birth of Legal Aid, 9 INT’L J. 
LEGAL PROF. 251 (2002).  For a discussion of the pro bono publico tradition in the legal 
profession, see generally Andrew Boon & Avis Whyte, “Charity and Beating Begins at 
Home”:  The Aetiology of the New Culture of Pro Bono Publico, 2 LEGAL ETHICS 169 
(1999), and Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 15. Legal aid costs could be recovered from the non-legally aided losing opponent.  
Further costs could be recovered (to an extent) from a legally aided winning party (through 
the statutory charge) and thus the scheme, while not cost neutral, allowed for recovery of 
costs to the taxpayer in some situations. For information on the operation of the statutory 
charge, see LEGAL AID AGENCY, THE STATUTORY CHARGE MANUAL 2–10 (2014). 
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taxpayers, rather than a redistribution of wealth between them.  In doing so, 
most citizens had the ability to obtain legal advice and the opportunity to 
access justice.16  There was congruence between the scheme’s aims:  a 
means by which the state could offer some measure of social protection to 
citizens through recourse to law while supporting the market as an engine 
of prosperity, and Keynesianism, the prevailing economic theory.17 
The Rushcliffe Committee, which took evidence on the merits of 
establishing a national legal aid system, determined that a private practice 
model was essential given that the rule of law demanded that a claimant’s 
legal dispute against the state be administered and conducted by an 
independent, rather than state employed, lawyer.18  During the period 
between its inception and the Conservative government’s return to power in 
1979, the scope and reach of the civil legal aid system broadened to reflect 
the original intentions of the Rushcliffe Committee, rather than the 1949 
compromise brokered among the Treasury, the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department, and the Law Society.19  As expectations about access to justice 
developed, the power and the role of solicitors increased and, consequently, 
so did the English Bar.  The legal profession had instantiated its 
professional status through these negotiations by underlining its lynchpin 
role in ensuring the rule of law, particularly important at a time when the 
consequences of a breakdown of the rule of law were all too evident in 
nearby countries. 
B.   Neoliberal Reforms:  The New Market Model 
At the height of the scheme an estimated 80 percent of the population 
was eligible for civil legal advice and assistance (including court 
representation) for a wide range of matters.  By the early 1990s, however, 
 
 16. See Susanne MacGregor, Welfare, Neo-Liberalism and New Paternalism:  Three 
Ways for Social Policy in Late Capitalist Societies, 67 CAP. & CLASS 91, 100 (1999); 
Richard Moorhead, Legal Aid in the Eye of a Storm:  Rationing, Contracting and a New 
Institutionalism, 25 J.L. & SOC’Y 365, 367 (1998); Spencer, supra note 14, at 270.  “An 
outstanding characteristic of expenditure on legal matters is that people may, through no 
fault of their own, be involved in litigation, the costs of which bear no relation to their 
financial circumstances and against which they could not reasonably be expected to make 
provision in advance.” Spencer, supra note 14, at 264 (citing PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, AST 
20/40 DRAFT MEMORANDUM ON LEGAL AID (Mar. 1945)). 
 17. This scheme could, following Talcott Parsons, be viewed as a functional mechanism 
to effect legitimation of the normative order through the conduit of a private practice actor 
who would both (1) represent the client and manage his expectations of the state, and 
(2) give an aura of authority and neutrality to the law (as well as legitimacy to the client’s 
concerns). See TALCOTT PARSONS, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34–49 (1954); 
TALCOTT PARSONS, SOCIETIES:  EVOLUTIONARY AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 10–11 
(Alex Inkeles ed., 1966).  Alan Paterson considers professionalism to be a neocontractual 
relationship by which the lawyer fulfills important social functions according to a contract 
with society. See PATERSON, supra note 9, at 16. 
 18. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND LEGAL ADVICE IN ENGLAND AND 
WALES, CMD. NO. 6641, at 23 (1945); see also Morgan, supra note 14, at 68; Spencer, supra 
note 14, at 259. 
 19. See Morgan, supra note 14, at 38; Spencer, supra note 14, at 255; see also DEP’T 
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, A FAIRER DEAL FOR LEGAL AID 8 (2005). 
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eligibility had dropped below 40 percent and the scope of the scheme had 
begun to shrink.20  The civil legal aid scheme appeared, superficially, to 
have conformed to Hayek’s contention that the state should allow a market 
to function with limited distortion caused through state interference:  legal 
aid clients could choose their lawyer freely and the lawyer would conduct 
the case as she or he would do for a privately paying client.21  But the case 
was taxpayer funded, and the burgeoning legal aid bill was incompatible 
with the Thatcherite government’s aim of public spending retrenchment to 
counteract the economic difficulties of the early 1980s.22  The discourse 
had shifted from Keynesianism to neoliberalism, and policies aimed at 
achieving this were pursued relentlessly.23 
Neoliberalism is an umbrella ideology that brings together the 
intellectual, bureaucratic, and political realms.24  Its Anglo-American, post-
welfare, capitalist, right-leaning roots have dominated the intellectual 
realm, where the market is deemed to be a neutral force for individual 
freedom and prosperity.  But, interestingly, most of the sites of recent 
struggle have been within left-leaning European countries with social 
democratic, welfarist, Keynesian traditions; the market has become so 
embedded in political and public postwar consciousness that the organizing 
principle of the market has found a home across the mainstream political 
spectrum.25  The bureaucratic regulatory responses may differ in left- and 
right-leaning environments, but the hallmarks of neoliberalism have been 
evident in both:  liberalization (including the “desacralization” of 
institutions that have historically been protected from market competition, 
such as the legal profession), deregulation, privatization, depoliticization, 
and monetarism.26  In its ideological heartland, the political realm, market-
centric politics have prevailed as the market has been reified to a common 
sense totalizing force for good.27  This has had a profound impact on legal 
professional autonomy, notions of inclusion within the legal market and by 
the legal market, and the nature of the duty to provide access to justice as a 
social and political good. 
The neoliberal model seeks to (1) address social issues with reference to 
market principles, (2) limit a “dependency culture,” and (3) incentivize 
creative private solutions that encourage consumer choice and power.28  
From the mid-1980s the government acted in keeping with Charles 
 
 20. See STEVE HYNES & JON ROBINS, LEGAL ACTION GRP., THE JUSTICE GAP:  WHATEVER 
HAPPENED TO LEGAL AID? 21 (2009). 
 21. See FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 41 (1994) (1944). 
 22. See Philip A. Thomas, Thatcher’s Will, 19 J.L. & SOC’Y 1, 9 (1992). 
 23. See id.; see also Hilary Sommerlad, Managerialism and the Legal Profession:  A 
New Professional Paradigm, 2 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 159, 165 (1995). 
 24. See Stephanie Lee Mudge, The State of the Art:  What is Neo-Liberalism, 6 SOCIO-
ECON. REV. 703, 704–05 (2008). 
 25. Id. at 704. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 705. 
 28. See ALCOCK, supra note 12, at 183–86. 
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Murray’s neoliberal thesis,29 to remove what it considered to be perverse 
incentives of lawyer-induced demand.30  There was a perception of a 
developing litigation culture where the state paid for much of the bill and 
the client took little of the risk.31  Businesses and the state were considered 
to be the victims of vexatious claims brought by underserving claimants 
represented by self-interested lawyers operating within a legal services 
market that was bloated and dysfunctional (classic neoliberal claims).32  
These were all clear market distortions that led to market failure and, in 
turn, resulted in a reduction in social well-being and greater unemployment, 
neoliberalists contended.33  Thus, means testing was reformed to cut 
eligibility for the civil legal scheme.  Subsequently, there were cuts in legal 
aid payment rates and, for the first time, a hard cap on legal aid 
expenditure.34  The administration of the scheme was transferred from the 
profession to a new statutory body, the Legal Aid Board, to be run on new 
public management principles.35  It could be argued, on the one hand, that 
the continued power of the legal profession resulted in an incremental 
“salami slicing” of the civil legal aid scheme, rather than a one-off radical 
reform.36  On the other hand, the grip of market individualism led different 
factions within the profession(s) to fight to keep their own areas within 
scope while allowing others to be sacrificed.37  The price of keeping the 
scheme, albeit in a blanched-out form, was the introduction of 
accountability measures through a regulatory system that foreshadowed the 
introduction of independent regulation of the legal profession later to be 
 
 29. See generally CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND:  AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 
1950–1980 (1984). See also ALAN DEACON, PERSPECTIVES ON WELFARE:  IDEAS, IDEOLOGIES 
AND POLICY DEBATES 32–42 (2002). 
 30. See Moorhead, supra note 16, at 376; Roger Smith, Legal Aid on an Ebbing Tide, 23 
J.L. & SOC’Y 570, 574 (1996). 
 31. In most forms of dispute in the United Kingdom, the loser pays the winner’s legal 
costs unless otherwise agreed.  Historically, this was not the case if the loser was a legal aid 
client (costs protection has since been reformed).  It was argued that this model incentivized 
the privately paying client to settle before court so as not to incur additional court costs 
regardless of whether they won or not.  For figures associated with this contention, see 
Smith, supra note 30, at 571–72. 
 32. See MacGregor, supra note 16, at 103–07. 
 33. See Thomas I. Palley, From Keynsianism to Neoliberalism:  Shifting Paradigms in 
Economics, in NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 10, at 20–29. 
 34. See Tamara Goriely, Rushcliffe Fifty Year On:  The Changing Role of Civil Legal 
Aid Within the Welfare State, 21 J.L. & SOC’Y 545, 556 (1994); Smith, supra note 30, at 
571–72; Spencer, supra note 14, at 266; Thomas, supra note 22, at 9. 
 35. For a detailed discussion of these changes in the civil legal aid system, see generally 
Moorhead, supra note 16; Sommerlad, supra note 23; Hilary Sommerlad, The 
Implementation of Quality Initiatives and the New Public Management in the Legal Aid 
Sector in England and Wales:  Bureaucratisation, Stratification and Surveillance, 6 INT’L J. 
LEGAL PROF. 311 (1999). 
 36. For a discussion of constituencies of power within a welfare state context, see 
Macgregor, supra note 16, at 105.  For a discussion of the legal profession as a constituency, 
see Thomas, supra note 22, at 5. 
 37. See Spencer, supra note 14, at 260–61.  Paterson contends that legal professionals 
stifled the public’s voice and thus defined what was in the public interest. See PATERSON, 
supra note 9, at 62. 
2015] LEGAL PROFESSIONAL DE(RE)REGULATION 2355 
introduced by the LSA 2007.38  Over time the scheme also opened up the 
legal aid market to those outside traditional legal practice, operating in not-
for-profit advice agencies.39  This was proof that nonlawyer organizations 
could deliver services effectively, and to a quality standard.  High street 
lawyers were unable to repel the state’s incursion into their territory, and 
the elite corporate branch of the profession did not come to their aid.  
Collective action had drained away with the last vestiges of Keynesianism, 
to be replaced by a neoliberal competition; as Margaret Thornton indicates, 
“competition is necessarily corrosive of community.”40  The legal 
profession as an institution was gradually being desacralized and individual 
lawyers, like much of society, quietly depoliticized. 
To complement civil legal aid the government introduced a market 
solution to access justice:  a fee regime known as “conditional fee 
arrangements” which was a forerunner of the “no win no fee” agreements 
often employed today.41  These arrangements were intended to shift 
financial risk from the state to the profession for all but the poorest in 
society.  Over time fee regimes were relaxed even further.42  A residual 
welfare state model, at the service of the market, was closer to being 
realized, with fewer clients eligible for legal aid assistance, and the market 
freed to provide creative fee solutions to non-legally aided “consumers.”43  
The commitment of lawyers to undertake legal aid began to wane, and as 
the economy was reshaped and Adam Smith’s market expansion 
mechanism44 developed to afford a greater division of labor resulting in 
specialization in service, the profession became more fragmented and 
 
 38. For a discussion of regulation and new public management in a legal aid context, see 
HILARY SOMMERLAD & PETER SANDERSON, TRAINING AND REGULATING THOSE PROVIDING 
PUBLICLY FUNDED LEGAL ADVICE SERVICES:  A CASE STUDY OF CIVIL PROVISION 37–76 
(2008); Richard Moorhead et al., Contesting Professionalism:  Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in 
England and Wales, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 765, 794–800 (2003); Richard Moorhead, Third 
Way Regulation?  Community Legal Service Partnerships, 64 MOD. L. REV. 543, 544–56 
(2001). 
 39. See Moorhead et al., supra note 38, at 772–75. 
 40. See Margaret Thornton, Neoliberal Melancholia:  The Case of Feminist Legal 
Scholarship, 20 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 7, 7 (2004). 
 41. See generally Maureen Spencer, The Common Law Legacy and Access to Justice:  
Contingency Fees and the Birth of Civil Legal Aid, 9 NOTTINGHAM L.J. 32 (2000).  Solicitors 
were permitted to waive their legal fees in instances where their client did not win, although 
the client remained liable for the opponent’s legal costs.  However, the solicitors had to 
charge the full fee plus a premium in a successful case, a strictly controlled predetermined 
percentage of the fees. See Hilary Sommerlad, Some Reflections on the Relationship Between 
Citizenship, Access to Justice, and the Reform of Legal Aid, 31 J.L. & SOC’Y 345, 345–46 
(2004) (explaining the shift from a duty to provide access to justice to a market risk–
opportunity calculation); see also RICHARD MOORHEAD ET AL., SCOPING PROJECT ON NO WIN 
NO FEE AGREEMENTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 23 (2009); Stella Yarrow & Pamela Abrams, 
Conditional Fees:  The Challenge to Ethics, 2 LEGAL ETHICS 192, 193–97 (1999). 
 42. For up-to-date information on fee regimes in England and Wales, see Main Changes, 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil-justice-reforms/main-
changes. 
 43. See ALCOCK, supra note 12, at 185. 
 44. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). 
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segmented.45  The profession that had used the importance of access to 
justice as the key reason for its independence from the state did not or could 
not make up the shortfall in supply to meet consumer need with non-state 
subsidized services.  A whole swathe of clients were returned to a prewar 
position of limited access to legal redress.  The Conservative government’s 
approaches had not only changed the civil legal aid system, but 
neoliberalism also encouraged much of the profession to adopt a more 
obviously business-led model of service provision.  The monolithic 
conception of old-style professionalism was challenged, as was its potential 
for collective action.46 
Even the terminology used by government and by sections of the legal 
profession gradually changed to reflect this switch:  the “practice of law” 
became the “provision of legal services,” and “legal professionals” became 
“legal service providers.”47  While some sections of the profession fiercely 
resisted these changes, most notably much of the English Bar and some 
solicitors who remained ideologically committed to legal aid as a social 
justice project, others embraced them wholeheartedly.48  Much of the 
access to justice discussion had shifted from universalism to individualism, 
mediated by market principles.49  So had professional practice. 
II.   THE LEGAL SERVICE ACT 2007:  EQUALITY AND INCLUSION 
FOR LEGAL CONSUMERS THROUGH THE MARKET? 
The LSA 2007 was enacted by a New Labour center-left government 
espousing the Third Way ideology at the height of the economic boom.  
The Third Way ideology requires the government to take an active role in 
investing in human and other resources so as to develop entrepreneurialism 
to create wealth, which can then be used to develop economic security and 
allow for redistribution.50  The Third Way ideology differs from classical 
social democracy in that it considers wealth creation to be fundamental to 
economic security and redistribution, but although the Third Way seeks to 
humanize the market, it accepts the theoretical tenets of neoliberalism 
 
 45. See Sommerlad, supra note 23, at 165; Thomas, supra note 22, at 7.  For a 
discussion of the ideological foundations of neoliberalism, see Clarke, supra note 10, at 50–
59.  For a discussion of the importance of specialization to the quality of legal work 
undertaken, see generally Moorhead et al., supra note 38. 
 46. See MacGregor, supra note 16, at 102–07; Thomas, supra note 22, at 2–3 (arguing 
that professional deregulation and developments in favor of an enterprise culture were not 
wholly government led, as some of these policies reflected what was already happening in 
some sectors of the legal profession). 
 47. See Thomas, supra note 22, at 5. 
 48. The Chairman of the Bar Council stated:  “[J]ustice cannot be measured in terms of 
competition and consumerism; justice is not a consumer durable; it is the hallmark of a 
civilised and democratic society.” Thomas, supra note 22, at 5 (citation omitted). 
 49. See MacGregor, supra note 16, at 110; see also Hilary Sommerlad, Reflections on 
the Reconfiguration of Access to Justice, 15 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 179, 181–83 (2008). 
 50. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY:  THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 99 
(1998). 
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regarding income distribution and the stability of capital economies.51  It 
differs in its bureaucratic response by placing emphasis on regulatory 
mechanisms to incentivize businesses and the professions to serve 
consumer interests, rather than leaving it to the market to determine whether 
to serve those interests.52 
Consequently, a new regulatory environment was introduced to break up 
professional monopolies and invigorate the legal market, while reducing the 
asymmetries of power between the consumer and service provider.  This 
was a step on the way to Milton Friedman’s “elementary . . . proposition 
that both parties to an economic transaction benefit from it, provided the 
transaction is bi-laterally voluntary and informed.”53  The LSA 2007 
uncoupled the machinery of admission, professional complaint, and 
discipline from the original professional bodies.  The Law Society of 
England and Wales, the General Council of the Bar, and the Chartered 
Institute of Legal Executives continue to act as professional associations for 
their members, have a campaigning role, and provide membership services.  
But the admission and disciplinary arms have been reallocated to 
independent (frontline) regulators with majority lay representation.54  
Consumer complaints are now made to the independent Legal Ombudsman 
(LeO), which has exclusive first instance jurisdiction over complaints’ 
redress in respect of admitted legal professionals, although discipline rests 
with the frontline regulators.55  The LSA 2007 also established an 
independent oversight regulator, the Legal Services Board (LSB), with 
statutory powers and duties to ensure that the regulatory objectives of the 
LSA are realized either through the frontline regulators or through direct 
intervention if necessary.56  A consumer panel has been established to 
advise the LSB on the consumer standpoint and barriers to accessing quality 
legal services at the right price in the right way.57  Professional autonomy 
has been removed in favor of an independent risk-based, outcome-focused 
approach to regulation and quality assurance, similar to regulatory policy in 
 
 51. For a discussion of New Labour and the Third Way from an economic perspective, 
see generally Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, The Economics of the Third Way, 6 NEW 
POL. ECON. 255 (2001); Palley, supra note 33, at 20–29. 
 52. For a brief discussion of the differences between the Third Way ideology and classic 
social democracy, see Palley, supra note 33, at 20–29. 
 53. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 13 (1982). 
 54. These are the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), the Bar Standards Board 
(BSB), and for chartered legal executives the Ilex Professional Standards (IPS). 
 55. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, §§ 112–161, schs. 16–19 (Eng.). 
 56. The regulatory objectives are:   
(a) protecting and promoting the public interest; (b) supporting the constitutional 
principle of the rule of law; (c) improving access to justice; (d) protecting and 
promoting the interests of consumers; (e) promoting competition in the provision 
of services . . . ; (f) encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal 
profession; (g) increasing public understanding of the citizen’s legal rights and 
duties; (h) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional principles.  
Id. § 1(1). 
 57. Id. § 8. 
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the financial services and related sectors.58  The regulatory intervention of 
the LSB serves as an agent of the Third Way to further entrepreneurialism 
in the legal services market while regulating so as to provide a measure of 
consumer protection. 
The reforms pose a real challenge to duty and service-based conceptions 
of professionalism, although fit more easily with Paterson’s 
neocontractualism.59  Essential features of the professions include self-
regulatory status, training and admission, complaints handling, disciplinary 
functions, an exclusive jurisdiction over particular types of work, and, in 
some definitions, responsibility to public service or duty.60  Gatekeeping 
controls provide a means to socialize nascent professionals and police the 
technical basis of the professional community.61  Regulation and ethical 
precepts provide a mechanism through which ongoing supervision may be 
undertaken, wrongdoing may be punished (to a greater or lesser extent), and 
status may be maintained or improved.62  The gatekeeping, accreditation, 
and regulation roles reassure the public, may be used to repel the state’s 
power, and are considered fundamental given that the profession’s claim to 
legitimacy rests on its role in the maintenance of the rule of law.  Critics of 
traditional models of professionalism, such as Richard Abel, argue that the 
legal profession sets entry requirements to create a barrier to limit the 
 
 58. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, REPORT ON COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONS:  A REPORT 
BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FAIR TRADING 2–10 (2001).  For a worked example of how 
economic theory and competition law may lead to an incursion in a rule of professional 
practice, see JOHN FLOOD & MORTEN HVIID, THE CAB RANK RULE:  ITS MEANING AND 
PURPOSE IN THE NEW LEGAL SERVICES MARKET:  REPORT FOR THE LEGAL SERVICES BOARD 
14–22 (2013). 
 59. See generally Alan A. Paterson, Professionalism and the Legal Services Market, 3 
INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 137 (1996).  For a discussion of professionalism and requirements 
linked to the ability to maintain professional autonomy, see generally Richard L. Abel, The 
Rise of Professionalism, 6 BRITISH J.L. & SOC’Y 82 (1979). See also ANDREW ABBOTT, THE 
SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS:  AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988); MAGALI S. 
LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM:  A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977). 
 60. For an in-depth discussion of the essential features of the professions, see generally 
THE END OF THE PROFESSIONS?:  THE RESTRUCTURING OF PROFESSIONAL WORK (Jane 
Broadbent et al. eds., 1997) (charting the development of the professions and features 
considered to be essential by most, but not all, professions). See also Gerald Hanlon & 
Joanna Shapland, Professional Disintegration?, in THE END OF THE PROFESSIONS?, supra, at 
103–122; PATERSON, supra note 9, at 5–58; Robert Dingwall & Paul Fenn, “A Respectable 
Profession”?  Sociological and Economic Perspectives on the Regulation of Professional 
Services, 7 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 51, 52 (1987); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professessions Are 
Dead, Long Live the Professions:  Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World, 33 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 713, 729–30 (1999); Paterson, supra note 59, at 137; Harold L. Wilensky, The 
Professionalization of Everyone?, 70 AM. J. SOC. 137, 138 (1964). 
 61. See LARSON, supra note 59, at 204; Abel, supra note 59, at 82; Penny Cavenagh, 
Chris Dewberry & Paul Jones, Becoming Professional:  When and How Does It Start?  A 
Comparative Study of First-Year Medical and Law Students in the UK, 34 MED. EDUC. 897 
(2000). 
 62. See Andrew Boon, From Public Service to Service Industry:   The Impact of 
Socialisation and Work on the Motivation and Values of Lawyers, 12 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 
229 (2005); Lisa Webley, Gate-Keeper, Supervisor or Mentor?  The Role of Professional 
Bodies in the Regulation And Professional Development of Solicitors and Family Mediators 
Undertaking Divorce Matters in England and Wales, 32 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 119 
(2010). 
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number of lawyers who reach full professional status so as to restrict supply 
of legal services and drive up prices.63  The justification that professional 
self-regulation ensures quality and competence is backed up by little 
empirical evidence.64  It is specialization, rather than professional 
affiliation, that appears to be the key to quality.65  Professional autonomy in 
policing its membership also allowed old hierarchies to persist, and the 
naturally conservative solicitors’ and barristers’ professions reproduced 
themselves very effectively and were relatively ineffective at addressing 
consumer complaints.66  In addition, some factions of the profession had 
linked their future to a pure business model, yet had retained a conservative 
model of power and privilege.  Regulatory intervention in the legal sector 
was the natural culmination of the intellectual and bureaucratic elements of 
neoliberal market ideology, a function of the profession’s perceived failure 
to create a market that functions to meet the public need for legal help when 
state funding was withdrawn. 
The LSA 2007 reforms need to be seen in the context of England’s 
historically narrow unauthorized practice of law rules, which were not 
amended by the LSA.  Contrary to many other jurisdictions, most legal 
activities are not reserved to admitted legal professionals; there are only six 
reserved activities that must be undertaken by qualified and admitted 
(authorized) lawyers.67  No single branch of the legal profession is 
authorized to conduct all six activities, although it is possible for 
individuals within each branch to undertake further accreditation to gain 
additional authorization to undertake more areas of reserved work.68  These 
provisions are not new, they were extant even before the introduction of the 
 
 63. See RICHARD L. ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE:  THE 
POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM (2003); Richard L. Abel, Taking Professionalism Seriously, 
1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 41, 43–44. But see PATERSON, supra note 9, at 53 (asserting that the 
lawyer professionalism is embedded within neocontractualism, which allows for change over 
time). 
 64. And indeed there is some evidence to the contrary. See RICHARD MOORHEAD, 
AVROM SHERR, LISA WEBLEY, SARAH ROGERS, LORRAINE SHERR, ALAN PATERSON & SIMON 
DOMBERGER, QUALITY AND COST:  FINAL REPORT ON THE CONTRACTING OF CIVIL, NON-
FAMILY ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE PILOT (2001); Moorhead et al., supra note 38, at 795. 
 65. See Moorhead et al., supra note 38, at 795, 799–800. 
 66. See RICHARD MOORHEAD ET AL., WILLING BLINDNESS?:  OSS COMPLAINTS 
HANDLING PROCEDURES 37 (2000); Lisa Webley et al., Access to a Career in the Legal 
Profession in England and Wales:  Race, Class and the Role of Educational Background, in 
DIVERSITY IN PRACTICE, supra note 3. 
 67. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 12 (Eng.).  The reserved activities are set out in 
the LSA 2007 schedules 2 and 12 but predate the Act:  (1) the exercise of rights of audience 
(i.e., appearing as an advocate before a court); (2) the conduct of litigation (i.e., issuing 
proceedings before a court and commencing, prosecuting, or defending those proceedings); 
(3) reserved instrument activities (i.e., dealing with the transfer of land or property under 
specific legal provisions including registration of land); (4) probate activities (i.e., handling 
probate/estate matters for clients); (5) notarial activities (i.e., work governed by the Public 
Notaries Act 1801); and (6) the administration of oaths (e.g., swearing affidavits, taking 
oaths). Id.  For a counterpoint in the U.S. context, see generally Deborah L. Rhode, Policing 
the Professional Monopoly:  A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized 
Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981). 
 68. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, §§ 12–21, sch. 2 (Eng.). 
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civil legal aid scheme, but the dynamic changes to legal professional 
regulation and law firm ownership have brought them to the attention of a 
much wider audience, and the new regulatory context is now more 
attractive to legal neophytes.69  The LSA 2007 has opened up the legal 
services sector to those who wish to invest in legal businesses; alternative 
business structures allow for the licensing of nonlawyer-owned businesses 
to provide authorized (reserved) legal services by authorized legal 
professionals, which was impermissible until the introduction of the LSA.  
But given that the legal profession(s)’s abilities to take collective action 
have been undermined, and that the reserved activity rules increasingly pit 
one legal professional branch against another, one legal professional against 
another, division of labor and market competition are assured in an 
environment in which admitted legal professionals and those with no legal 
accreditation compete vigorously for consumers. 
The dazzling array of options open to consumers, the huge knowledge 
asymmetry in a messy professional arena, and the lack of consistent 
regulation make this a difficult environment to navigate successfully for 
consumers.70  The risk of legal costs and the potential rewards of legal 
action are now borne by individual consumers and shared, in some 
instances, with lawyers, rather than by the taxpayer through the legal aid 
scheme.  It is a little early to be able to track trends in access to justice, but 
early indications suggest that increasing numbers of clients are self-
representing and may not be able to seek expert evidence to support their 
cases.71  Alternative providers and greater publicity of non-reserved 
services may increase options for consumers at a price they can afford.72  
But non-reserved services undertaken by service providers who are not 
formally admitted to one of the branches of the profession remain beyond 
the jurisdiction of the LeO, giving rise to consumer protection concerns as 
well as a distorted market.  The solicitors profession’s standing in the 
debate would be much improved by switching admission to the Roll of 
solicitors (albeit with a requirement of a period of work-based training 
under supervision) to before the training contract phase so as to permit 
regulation of this cadre of lawyers who are seeking employment in the new 
 
 69. See Webley, supra note 3. 
 70. For further discussion on the legal service markets, see Richard Moorhead, Why 
There Might Be a Market for Lemons:  Some Thoughts on Competition, Quality and 
Regulation in Legal Service Markets, in UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR 
LEGAL SERVICES REGULATION—A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 24 (Legal Services Board ed., 
2011).  Richard Moorhead argues that competition on quality is critically dependent on the 
consumer’s knowledge of quality so that he or she may act on that knowledge to make 
rational decisions. Id.  He also indicates that clients have relatively limited knowledge about 
differences in lawyer quality, making assumptions that they are relatively similar in their 
abilities. Id. 
 71. See RICHARD MOORHEAD & MARK SEFTON, DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, 
LITIGANTS IN PERSON:  UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN FIRST INSTANCE PROCEEDINGS 251–52 
(2005); LIZ TRINDER ET AL., MINISTRY JUSTICE, LITIGANTS IN PERSON IN PRIVATE FAMILY 
LAW CASES 73–74 (2014); KIM WILLIAMS, MINISTRY JUST., LITIGANTS IN PERSON:  A 
LITERATURE REVIEW 3 (2011). 
 72. See Webley, supra note 3. 
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market without professional affiliation or regulation.73  This would bring far 
more legal service providers within the scope of the regulated profession 
and enormously increase the diversity of the professional bodies, creating a 
stronger voice in the legal service market.  It would also dilute the 
profession’s gatekeeping role and, therefore, some may be anxious about 
reduction in exclusivity claims and, thus, of status.  As things stand, it is 
extremely difficult for consumers to know who is an admitted lawyer.  
Distinctions between different professional groupings are difficult to 
pinpoint, as are the consequences of those affiliations.  But rather than 
working together to send a unified message to the public about admission, 
regulation, and consumer protection, each professional branch is attempting 
to capitalize on market deregulation so as to gain a share of each other’s 
traditional markets. 
Further, by bearing down on eligibility for legal aid and taking most 
people out of the scope of the civil scheme, successive governments have 
managed with clever sleight of hand to remove legal aid funding from the 
forefront of public consciousness.  The public does not see the nexus 
between access to civil justice and the rule of law and has largely accepted 
state rhetoric that lawyers are in league with business rather than champions 
for the ordinary citizen.74  The LSA 2007 reforms may deliver a plurality of 
services at a range of costs, but it is not yet clear that they can deliver 
inclusion and equality for legal consumers.  Nor is it likely that professional 
bodies will be able to provide much help to legal consumers in this regard.  
The depoliticization ushered in by neoliberalism and its academic 
equivalent postmodernism, both of which turn attention away from macro 
claims to focus attention on the micro, and the individual, has neutered 
political social justice movements and depoliticized much of the 
professional elite, including the legal profession75 and its client base.76  If 
the market cannot provide access to justice, the profession is unlikely at 
present to be able to mobilize its members and the public to affect political 
change. 
 
 73. The new Bar Code regulates all barristers (fully qualified or otherwise) for reserved 
and unreserved matters post call/admission to the Bar but pre-pupillage. See BAR 
STANDARDS BD., THE BAR STANDARDS BOARD HANDBOOK R. 17.1, 17.8 (2014).  They are not 
fully admitted to practice but they are members of a professional association and are 
regulated by the frontline regulator the BSB. For details, see Marc Mason, UK:  Room at the 
Inns—The Increased Scope of Regulation Under the New Bar Standards Board Handbook 
for England and Wales, 17 LEGAL ETHICS 143 (2014). 
 74. See, e.g., Sadiq Khan, Cutting Legal Aid Is an Easy Gimmick—This Is Part of a 
Pattern, GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/ 
feb/27/cutting-legal-aid-reform-chris-grayling-justice-system. 
 75. The criminal Bar, however, has recently held an unprecedented strike to protest 
against cuts to criminal legal aid. See Jonathan Ames, Crime Barristers Strike Over Legal 
Aid Cuts As Solicitors Call for Leaders to Resign, LAWYER, Mar. 7, 2014, available at 
http://www.thelawyer.com/news/crime-barristers-strike-over-legal-aid-cuts-as-solicitors-
call-for-leaders-to-resign/3017273.article. 
 76. For a discussion of neoliberalism, the depoliticization, and the postmodern turn, see 
Thornton, supra note 40, at 9. 
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III.   THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS:  
CAN THE FREE MARKET DELIVER GREATER EQUALITY 
AND INCLUSION FOR ASPIRANT LEGAL PROFESSIONALS? 
The profile of law graduates in England and Wales has markedly 
diversified over the past thirty years.77  From the mid-1980s, the solicitors 
profession (and to a lesser extent the Bar) needed to increase in size to serve 
the expanding business market.  This expansion coincided with the state-
supported expansion of higher education places to meet broader market 
needs:  the proportion of U.K. seventeen- to thirty-year-olds who attended 
university fluctuated between 10 and 15 percent during late 1960s to 1980s, 
then rose steadily to approximately 40 percent in 2000, and has now 
reached approximately 49 percent of that age group.78  Undergraduate 
tuition fees were, primarily, met by the state rather than by the students 
themselves until the introduction of undergraduate student fees in 1998.79  
Further, access to the legal profession was extended, albeit tentatively and 
briefly from the late 1980s to the early 2000s; registered traineeships 
increased by 62.4 percent between 1989 and 1990 and 1999 and 2000—
from 3524 to 5285.80  Given that the traditional pool of elites was 
insufficient to meet market needs, the population of black, Asian, minority 
ethnic (BAME)81 and female entrants to the legal profession increased.82 
Today, law school graduating cohorts continue to diversify.83  The 
proportion of law graduates who self-define as BAME is about 32 percent 
 
 77. See LAW SOC’Y, TRENDS IN THE SOLICITORS’ PROFESSION 2013, at 32–36 (2014). 
 78. For a discussion of this trend, see Haroon Chowdry et al., Widening Participation in 
Higher Education:  Analysis Using Linked Administrative Data, 176 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 
431 (2013), and IAN WALKER & YU ZHU, DEP’T FOR BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS, THE 
IMPACT OF UNIVERSITY DEGREES ON THE LIFE CYCLE OF EARNINGS:  SOME FURTHER 
ANALYSIS 36–49 (2013). 
 79. See SECURING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION:  AN INDEPENDENT 
REVIEW OF HIGHER EDUCATION FUNDING & STUDENT FINANCE 18–19 (2010).  The fees 
regimes was as follows:  £1,000 per year in 1998; £3,000 per year in 2004; £3,290 per year 
in 2011; and, up to £9,000 per year in 2012.  Even given the introduction of fees, the 
diversification of the law graduate population continued as students continued to be drawn to 
vocationally orientated degree subjects. See UNIVERSITIES UK, PATTERNS AND TRENDS IN UK 
HIGHER EDUCATION 10–14 (2012). 
 80. See BILL COLE, LAW SOC’Y, TRENDS IN THE SOLICITORS’ PROFESSION:  ANNUAL 
STATISTICAL REPORT 2000, at 65–67 (2000). 
 81. Black, Asian, and minority ethnic (BAME) is the phraseology used in the United 
Kingdom in place of the U.S. phraseology of “minorities.” 
 82. See COLE, supra note 80, at 65–67.  In 1999, 15.8 percent of traineeships went to 
BAME law graduates and 56.9 percent went to female law graduates. Id. at 66.  Forty-eight 
percent of them were registered in London with more than half registered in the square mile 
of the City of London pointing to commercial expansion at the time. Id. at 66–67. 
 83. The LL.B. is a three-year undergraduate law degree, similar to the J.D. qualification.  
All LL.B. degree programs must be approved by the Joint Academic Stages Board, which 
has a similar function to American Bar Association accreditation.  LL.B. degrees are classed 
as qualifying law degrees, meaning that once a student has successfully attained an LL.B. 
(Hons) degree she or he may continue on to the one-year vocational qualification required to 
train to be a solicitor (the Legal Practice Course) or a barrister (Bar Professional Training 
Course).  After that a would-be solicitor would need to secure a two-year training contract in 
a law firm or equivalent and undertake some final examinations, and a would-be barrister 
would need to secure two six-month pupillages.  Training contracts and pupillages are forms 
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of the graduating population,84 and the U.K. BAME population is recorded 
as 14 percent (it has increased from 6 percent in 1991 to 9 percent in 
2001).85  Yet the diversity of the professions has not kept pace.  The point 
of attrition is evident at the compulsory work-based training stage, when the 
BAME population drops from over 30 percent at the vocational stage of 
education, to 13 percent (pupil barristers) and 22 percent (trainee solicitors), 
demonstrating the persistence of raced and classed hiring practices.  Those 
from less traditionally privileged professional backgrounds remain at a 
great disadvantage in securing professionally legitimated training that 
affords the opportunity to become admitted legal professionals (as solicitors 
and barristers).86  BAME lawyers have greater difficulty in accessing 
vocational in-practice training, and when they do, they are concentrated 
within the less prestigious parts of the professions and have greater attrition 
rates from the legal profession relative to their white counterparts.87  They 
are proportionately more likely to be in solo practice than are white 
solicitors; this may be due, in part, to the greater difficulties they face with 
gaining entry into, and progression within, the more lucrative and 
established parts of the profession.88  Additional promotion barriers 
confront the essentialist category of women; they are admitted in proportion 
to their graduating numbers but still struggle to progress at the same rate as 
men.89  There is some evidence that the Bar is drawing its pupils from an 
increasingly privileged class background; the solicitor’s profession is not 
 
of heavily supervised paid practice that operate similar to apprenticeships.  Post completion 
of a training contract or the pupillages, the solicitor or barrister is fully qualified but is still 
required to work within a supervised context for an additional three years before they have 
full practice rights or the opportunity to practice solo.  Consequently, in most instances it is 
compulsory to gain one of a limited number of training contracts or pupillages to be able to 
practice law as an admitted legal professional (to undertake reserved activities) unless one 
takes the CILEx route to qualification to become a chartered legal executive. 
 84. It is considered that approximately 10 percent of law graduates on qualifying law 
degrees are overseas students, some of which will self-define as BAME although it is 
unclear the extent to which this affects the figures presented above.  Further, not all 
LPC/BPTC and training contract/pupillage applicants will have undertaken an undergraduate 
LL.B. degree.  Approximately 5000 students a year undertake the Graduate Diploma in Law 
course, which is an intensive graduate program that one may take following successful 
completion of a non-law undergraduate degree. See Lisa Webley, What Empirical Legal 
Studies Tell Us About the Legal Profession, Professorial Inaugural Lecture (Mar. 20, 2013), 
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixai0rliaRw. 
 85. See OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, ETHNICITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN ENGLAND 
AND WALES 2011, at 1, 4 (2012), available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-
census/key-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-england-and-wales/rpt-ethnicity.html. 
 86. See SOMMERLAD ET AL., supra note 3, at 58–60; Webley et al., supra note 6. 
 87. See SOLICITORS REGULATORY AUTH., INDEPENDENT REVIEW INTO DISPROPORTIONATE 
REGULATORY OUTCOMES FOR BLACK AND MINORITY ETHNIC SOLICITORS 7 (2008), available 
at http://www.sra.org.uk/ouseley/; see also LAW SOC’Y, ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN LAW FIRMS—
UNDERSTANDING THE BARRIERS 4 (2010). 
 88. See Lisa Webley, United Kingdom:  What Robinson v. Solicitors Regulation 
Authority Tells Us About the Contested Terrain of Race and Disciplinary Processes, 16 
LEGAL ETHICS 236, 241 (2013). 
 89. For a discussion, see Webley & Duff, supra note 7. 
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immune from this charge, either, as a recent study concluded.90  A 
pronounced link between class and race in British society91 exacerbates the 
barriers BAME law graduates face.92  Traditional law firm and chambers 
hiring practices focus on cultural capital held in greater measure by social 
elites believing them to be intellectual elites too; this results in unequal 
opportunities93 and unequal access to a career in the legal profession.94  
Although the Law Society and Bar Council have noted these concerns, they 
have been more inclined to encourage measures that aim to raise the 
aspirations of BAME school pupils to attend elite law schools rather than to 
challenge the prevailing view that elite schooling necessarily indicates 
lawyer excellence.95 
Is the supply-side market free to choose who it accepts within it and in 
what role?  The figures above would suggest that it is, as it is still largely 
admitted legal professionals who choose whom to hire as trainees and 
pupils and, consequently, who joins them in the legitimated, higher status 
end of the legal services market.  Those that cannot gain entry are free to 
work as paralegals, or to join the non-reserved sector.  But they do not 
enjoy the same status, they are not subject to the same disciplinary 
provisions, and they are not within the jurisdiction of the LeO.  Does this 
serve the demand side well?  The LSB has been given a statutory obligation 
to encourage an independent, strong, diverse, and effective legal profession, 
 
 90. In 2010–2011, more than one-third (34.5 percent) of pupillages were awarded to 
elite educated “Oxbridge” (Oxford or Cambridge) graduates, and this figure appears to be 
increasing (23.7 percent were Oxbridge-educated in the previous year), although publicly 
available data makes it difficult to confirm this. See BAR STANDARDS BD., BAR BAROMETER 
TRENDS IN THE PROFILE OF THE BAR 49 (2011); BAR STANDARDS BD., BAR BAROMETER 
TRENDS IN THE PROFILE OF THE BAR 49 (2012); see also OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, supra 
note 85, at 4.  Although it is argued that an elite education brings with it elite abilities, there 
is little evidence to suggest this is actually true, and there is strong evidence that class 
background plays an important role in gaining the grades required to enter elite institutions. 
See Webley et al., supra note 6. 
 91. See ETHNICITY, SOCIAL MOBILITY, AND PUBLIC POLICY:  COMPARING THE USA AND 
UK 3–5 (Glenn C. Loury et al. eds., 2005); Louise Archer, Constructing Minority Ethnic 
Middle Class Identity:  An Exploratory Study with Parents, Pupils and Young Professionals, 
4 SOC. 134, 144 (2011). 
 92. See, e.g., BEVERLY SKEGGS, FORMATIONS OF CLASS & GENDER:  BECOMING 
RESPECTABLE 94–95 (1997); John H. Goldthorpe, Rent, Class Conflict, and Class Structure:  
A Commentary on Sørensen, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1572, 1573 (2000). 
 93. See Max Weber, Economic and Social History, in MAX WEBER SELECTIONS IN 
TRANSLATION 285 (W.G. Runciman ed., E. Matthews trans., 1978); see also Richard Breen, 
Foundations of a Neo-Weberian Class Analysis, in APPROACHES TO CLASS ANALYSIS 31–50 
(Erik Olin Wright ed., 2005). 
 94. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 371 (George Simpson 
trans., 1964); ALAN MILBURN, UNLEASHING ASPIRATION:  THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PANEL 
ON FAIR ACCESS TO THE PROFESSIONS (2009); ALAN MILBURN, FAIR ACCESS TO 
PROFESSIONAL CAREERS:  A PROGRESS REPORT BY THE INDEPENDENT REVIEWER ON SOCIAL 
MOBILITY AND CHILD POVERTY 2 (May 2012). 
 95. For more information on the Law Society’s emphasis on the PRIME scheme, see 
LAW SOC’Y, PRIME AND SOCIAL MOBILITY (2013), available at 
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/policy-campaigns/articles/prime-and-social-mobility/.  Many 
of the law firms that participate in the scheme recruit trainee solicitors from a narrow elite 
band of U.K. law schools. 
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and to support the constitutional principle of the rule of law as indicated 
above.  To this end the LSB requires all legal entities to collect and report a 
wide range of diversity data to allow judgments to be made.  It also has the 
power to intervene in the market if the professions do not deliver a diverse 
legal profession, but it is unclear what would constitute sufficient 
diversity.96  The LSB has supported the extension of more reserved 
activities to CILEx, the chartered legal executive branch of the profession 
that has greater heterogeneity of routes to full admission and a much better 
record on diversity.  The CILEx route to professional qualification holds 
out the promise of professional admission as long as law graduates97 work 
in a legal environment undertaking legal work under the supervision of an 
admitted professional (an apprenticeship model undergirded with degree-
level examinations and continuing professional education requirements).  A 
once blocked section of the law graduate population may now have an 
access route into the profession, even if being a professional may not be 
once what it was.  But this model currently lacks status in the market.  The 
market thrives on division of labor and stratification and, so, the question is 
not whether there is stratification, but whether that stratification serves the 
market well.  While Milton Friedman contends that the market will pay 
each individual what she or he is worth, Keynesians caution against this 
indicating that power imbalances are inherent in any market.  The Third 
Way regulatory principles built into the LSA 2007 provide a mechanism to 
counterbalance these power relations, but they would have to be recognized 
as such to trigger a regulatory response. 
The business case for diversity is part of the market’s mercurial 
reinvention of itself.  As Margaret Thornton indicates, “The movement 
away from the dissonant language of in-equality in favour of diversity 
serves to depoliticise further a competitive market environment in which 
inequality is necessarily normative.”98  Legal professionals acting as 
gatekeepers to training contracts and pupillages continue to be heavily 
influenced by proxies for excellence that bolster their own status within the 
field.99  The market metanarrative that each individual gets what she or he 
 
 96. David Edmonds, Training the Lawyers of the Future—A Regulator’s View, 45 L. 
TCHR. 4, 13–14 (2010). 
 97. It is not necessary to be a law graduate:  CILEx offers a range of tiered membership 
levels and has examinations that mirror much of the law degree curriculum that allow non-
graduates to work toward full professional qualification as a Fellow of CILEx too. See The 
Cilex Route, CILEX, 
http://www.cilexlawschool.ac.uk/prospective_students/qualify_as_solicitor/the_CILEx_rout
e (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
 98. Thornton, supra note 40, at 12; see also Wendy Bottero & Sarah Irwin, Locating 
Difference; Class, “Race” and Gender, and the Shaping of Social Inequalities, 51 SOC. REV. 
463, 479–80 (2003). 
 99. For a discussion of the proxies used, see generally Louise Ashley & Laura Empson, 
Differentiation and Discrimination:  Understanding Social Class and Social Exclusion in 
Leading Law Firms, 66 HUM. REL. 219 (2013); Louise Ashley, Making A Difference?  The 
Use (and Abuse) of Diversity Management at the UK’s Elite Law Firms, 24 WORK, EMP. & 
SOC’Y 711, 717–19 (2010); Andy Cook et al., London’s Legal Elite:  Recruitment Through 
Cultural Capital and the Reproduction of Social Exclusivity in City Professional Service 
Fields, 44 ENV’T & PLAN. 1744, 1750–58 (2012); Webley et al., supra note 6. 
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deserves is so instantiated that there is little critical reflection on the proxies 
that are used, on personal complicity in the division of labor and status, and 
on the iron grip of the market.100  Even were the state to return to the 
politics of social justice, would much of the commercially orientated 
profession be prepared to reflect on its use of (some) law graduates as 
human resources to extract surplus value to fuel their profit streams?  The 
“over supply” of law graduates is useful cover for a project that seeks to 
innovate in its delivery of services, increase productivity through greater 
work intensification, and reduce the number of highly paid staff.101  Where 
possible it will reduce exposure to low profit work and focus on global 
markets where greater profits are available—it will hire lawyers who appeal 
to the elites that they serve.  But can the market also deliver for everyday 
consumers, at a price they can afford and at a quality that protects their 
interests? 
CONCLUSIONS:  REGULATION, EQUALITY, DIVERSITY, 
AND INCLUSION IN THE LEGAL MARKET 
The LSA 2007 produces a series of interesting paradoxes:  marketization; 
greater understanding of reserved and unreserved activities by those outside 
the profession; the potential to increase access to a legal career for 
marginalized groups; and the potential for greater access to legal redress at 
the right price for consumers.  A lack of professional body engagement with 
structural inequality in admission to the profession, and also to an extent in 
terms of access to justice, has begun to erode its monopoly status as the 
gatekeeper for all legal professionals.  Supermarkets such as the Co-
operative are introducing high street law practice to the public and are 
hiring lawyers of all levels of qualification, admission status, and 
socioeconomic and university background (including non-graduates), to 
provide those services.  Professional bodies have understandably begun a 
call to arms to reduce the influx of “unqualified” legal advisers into the 
market, in part by placing ethics, training, and regulation onto the agenda.  
Yet, it is in part the established professions’ failure to engage with these 
issues at an earlier point, the persistent “structured inequality” within the 
profession, coupled with a lack of a clarion public service ethos, which 
allowed the state to introduce legislation that removed most of the last 
vestiges of professional autonomy from once strong organizations.  But old 
status hierarchies persist in some sections of the market as the aura of the 
old professions and the old hierarchies within them give a prestige that can 
be leveraged.  They will continue to operate gatekeeper-closure measures so 
as to filter potential members of their professions for as long as they yield 
value.  Over time, CILEx may yet challenge this in high street and everyday 
 
 100. See Stephen Ackroyd & Daniel Muzio, The Reconstructed Professional Firm:  
Explaining Change in English Legal Practices, 28 ORG. STUD. 729, 739–41 (2007); Hilary 
Sommerlad, The Commercialisation of Law and the Enterprising Legal Practitioner:  
Continuity and Change, 18 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 73, 76–77 (2011). 
 101. See Clarke, supra note 10, at 54–55. 
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legal contexts, but it is unlikely to dent the corporate sphere to any great 
degree. 
Neoliberalism has diversified the range of options that clients and would-
be lawyers have open to them, but individuals are required to make choices 
and to take responsibility for those choices.  Low-income and first-time 
consumers will struggle without adequate signposting of differences 
between the regulated and unregulated sector, even if they can find services 
at a price they can afford.  The limited nature of the LeO jurisdiction creates 
a distortion that means that the market is neither truly free, nor truly 
regulated, for the benefit of consumers.  And would-be admitted 
professionals can do little to overcome the market distortions of the training 
contract and pupillage control mechanism unless and until the market 
provides them with a power base from which to seek change.  The ideology 
of neoliberalism has won through, but the bureaucratic responses have yet 
to allow the market to function as an inclusive market.  The question 
Stephanie Lee Mudge poses is not the historic “how much state,” but the 
contemporary “how much market” do we need?102  How much regulatory 
intervention is required so as to allow all would-be legal professionals to be 
judged on the basis of their competence and productivity, rather than their 
background and status?  And how much regulatory intervention is required 
so as to allow all consumers to be full actors in the market to choose 
services on the basis of quality and costs to secure their legal rights and 
access justice? 
 
 
 102. See Mudge, supra note 24, at 724. 
